1947 amendments, two alternative treatments under the Act were advocated. The majority of the House Committee on Labor and Education recommended that supervisors be excluded from the protections of the Act, 7 urging that the employer's need for loyal supervisory personnel" outweighed the organizational interests of the supervisors. The minority on the Committee favored according supervisors organizational and bargaining rights, arguing that a prohibition against association with rank and file organizations would be sufficient to protect the employers' legitimate interests. 9 The Taft-Hartley Act, 10 which emerged from this debate, excludes supervisors from the definition of the term "employee,"' 1 enabling employers to condition supervisors' employment upon nonmembership in the union or nonparticipation in union affairs. 12 Nevertheless, the law does not ban supervisors from wholly supervisory unions or from those including, or even dominated by, rank and file employees.' 3 Employers may agree to negotiate with the union concerning the supervisors' conditions of employment, but they cannot be compelled by federal or state authority to do so. 4 7 H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1947) Ryec. 5138 (1947) , 2 LEGIsLATIVE HisroRY OF LMRA, supra note 5, at 1480 (remarks of Senator Hatch). 10 Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), § § 1-47, 29 U.S.C. § § 141- 87 (1970) , amending 49 Stat. 449 (1935) [hereinafter cited as LMRA]. For a discussion of the impact of this legislation on a strike in process when it was passed, see Levinson, supra note 1, at 94.
11 LMRA § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970). 12 Although supervisors are not accorded the protection of the Act, the Board, on occasion, has found section 8(a)(1) violations for discharges of supervisors because of the alleged impact on the rank and file employees. E.g., Talladega i3 LMRA § 14(a), 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) provides that "[n]othing herein shall prohibit any individual employed as a supervisor from becoming or remaining a member of a labor organization .... "
14 LMRA § 14(a), 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1970) concludes: "No employer subject to this [Act] shall be compelled to deem individuals defined herein as supervisors as employees for the purpose of any law, either national or local, relating to collective bargaining." Thus, the NLRB may not include supervisors in Board certified units. See LMIRA § § 9(a), 14(a), 29 U.S.C. § § 159(a), 164(a) (1970) ; Sakrete, Inc. v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 902, 908 (9th Cir. 1964 ), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965 . C. MoRRSs, supra note 12, at 205. Nor may a union condition the signing of a contract applicable to employees covered by the Act The Act, however, provides little guidance for resolving two problems that frequently occur when unions that represent both supervisory and rank and file members are recognized. Section 8(b)(1)(B) 15 prohibits unions from coercing or restraining employers in selection of representatives for purposes of grievance adjustment or collective bargaining, but leaves unanswered the questions of the extent to which unions may discipline supervisor-members and the extent to which supervisormembers may participate in union decision making. The NLRB and the courts have treated these as independent problems.
II. UNION DISCIPLINE OF SUPERVISORS
A union's effectiveness is directly related to the support it receives from employees. To encourage that support, unions apply to recalcitrant members a variety of sanctions, including fines, suspension and expulsion. The effectiveness of suspension or expulsion as a sanction has been diminished by decisions that preserve the employee's job status when he has been suspended or expelled for reasons other than failure to pay regular dues and initiation fees, even though a valid union security dause requiring all employees to be union members had been negotiated with the employer. 16 Since 1967, however, effectiveness of fines as a sanction has increased as a result of the Supreme Court's ruling in NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.1 7 that fines imposed by unions can, if they are reasonable, be enforced in the courts. In AllisChalmers, an employee-member who had participated in the union strike vote was fined for crossing the picket line set up during the subsequent strike. Over the dissent of four justices, the Court rejected the employer's contention that such fines coerced the employees in violation of section 8(b) (1) After Allis-Chalmers announced that section 8(b)(1)(A) does not bar unions from disciplining employee-members who have violated valid union rules and decisions, 19 the NLRB was asked to determine if such discipline, when directed at supervisor-members, violates the Act. 20 In performing his job, the supervisor may often find it necessary to take actions that are distasteful to some employees and contrary to the union's constitution or bylaws. The ability of the union to discipline supervisors fpr such actions may inhibit management's operation of the business. Of course, under the Taft-Hartley Act, the employer does not have unfettered discretion in its conduct of the business and is obliged to bargain with validly established unions concerning employees' wages and conditions of employment. 21 The resultant collective bargaining agreement establishes limitations on employer prerogatives, enforceable through judicial proceedings and, if the contract provides, through grievance and arbitration mechanisms. Union attempts to discipline supervisors, when the offending action concerns the supervisors' employment activities, may circumvent these established procedures or create restrictions on employer conduct that the union was unable to obtain at the bargaining 
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The NLRB has confronted this problem in a number of cases. This section provides that it is an unfair labor practice for a union to "restrain or coerce . .. an employer in the selection of his representatives for purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances." The section does not deal specifically with the propriety of or limitations on union discipline of supervisor-members. Rather, it was enacted in order to prevent a certain union bargaining tacticobjection by a union to the particular individuals whom the employer had chosen to represent him. 28 It was designed to accord employers the right, already granted to employees under section 7, "to choose whomever they wish to represent them in formal labor negotiations.
29
The NLRB first used section 8(b)(l)(B) to prohibit conduct other than that clearly within the section's intended scope in San FranciscoOakland Mailers' Local 18.30 In that case, the union fined supervisormembers for failure to appear before its executive committee to explain alleged contract violations, including use of an assistant foreman to repair a machine and permitting nonunion members to engage in bargaining unit work. The Board found this a violation of section 8(b)(1)(B). It reasoned that, while the union had not tried to force a [40:185 substitution of negotiating personnel as 8(b)(1)(B) explicitly outlawed, it had "sought the substitution of attitudes rather than persons,"' 1 and had imposed pressure on the employer's grievance representatives to achieve that end. The Board concluded that such action was the functional equivalent of the union's assertion of control over the fdentity of the employer's grievance representatives since the employer "would have to replace its foreman or face de facto non-representation by them." 3 2
Shortly after its decision in San Francisco-Oakland Mailers', the Board, in Syd Gough & Sons, Inc., 33 refused to find a violation of 8(b)(1)(B) when a union fined a supervisor-member for failure to comply with a union rule requiring a member of a sister local to register with the local union before working in its district. The Board dismissed the employer's complaint, finding that discipline for infraction of this housekeeping rule did not give the union a veto over the supervisor's job selection or employment decisions and, therefore, affected only the union-union member relationship. 34 In Syd Gough & Sons, the Board thus refused to apply section 8(b)(I)(B) to discipline that in no way affects the employer's business conduct. In subsequent cases, however, once it has found that the union's discipline is intended to affect union-employer relations, the Board has given the section a broad application. its ttrms, confined to the employer's representatives in collective bargaining and grievance adjustment. Nonetheless, the Board has held that the section applies to union discipline of supervisors for performing any employment related function.
A. The Disciplined Representative
The Board's early decisions reflect some concern with whether the disciplined supervisor had either collective bargaining or grievance adjustment responsibilities.
38 Some rank and file unions maintain that section 8(b)(1)(B) was designed to apply only to an employer's high level representatives who are responsible for formulating labor relations policies.
3 7 They have sought to distinguish personal grievances that involve "some question of fact or conduct peculiar to the employee, not affecting the unit," from contractual grievances that "raise a question of the meaning of the contract or present a situation not covered by the contract touching which agreement ought to be made."
38
The NLRB has rejected this distinction 9 and ruled that supervisors (Otlen Co.) who can adjust "on-thespot" grievances, 40 whether or not pursuant to a grievance and arbitration procedure in the collective agreement, are employers' representatives for purposes of section 8(b)(1)(B). The Board reasoned that the extent to which union discipline frustrates the employer's assertion of control over persons engaged in resolving disputes on the employer's behalf is unaffected by the origin of the grievance procedure.
41
The NLRB has also extended section 8(b)(1)(B) to cover discipline of supervisors who do not represent the employer in the resolution of any dispute, formal or informal. In Toledo Blade Co., 4 2 the Board found that the disciplined supervisors had grievance adjustment responsibilities. It noted, however, that even if the supervisors had not had such responsibilities when they were subjected to union discipline, they were "such natural and potential representatives of the employer for the handling and settlement of grievances . . .-14 that, in the future, the employer would probably delegate grievance adjustment authority to them. The Board concluded that union control over the attitudes of persons likely to be handling grievance matters entails the same risks that Congress perceived when it precluded control over their identity in section 8(b)(1)(B). Toledo Blade indicated that any supervisor with I']he distinction between "personal grievance" and "contractual grievances" as it relates to an employer's obligation to bargain collectively only with the exclusive bargaining agent ... has no relevance to the construction of the broad term "grievances" as used not only in the proviso of Section 9(a) of the Act but also in sections 2(11) and 8(b)(1)(B), and that in all three Sections of the Act it must be uniformly construed as including both "personal grievances" and "contractual grievances M. 1770 (1971) , the union fined an assistant foreman for creating disturbances in the pressroom and for having berated the steward, a fellow union member. The NLRiB ruled that the disciplined supervisor was an employer's representative for purposes of section 8(b)(1)(B), since he could adjust on-the-spot complaints occuring during his shift, and therefore found an unfair labor practice. M. 1715 (1971) , the Board rejected the union's argument that a supervisor empowered to deal only with minor complaints excluded from the collective agreement's grievance procedure was not an employer's representative for purposes of adjustment of grievances, finding instead that the company had not "waived its right to deal with employee complaints other than by formal grievances and arbitration procedure." Id., 78 L.R.R.M. at 1716. It therefore ruled that the union had violated section 8(b) (1) 1042 (1971) , the administrative law judge dismissed a complaint against a union for disciplining a member who violated a union rule requiring members to report work done with a nonunion member. In affirming the administrative law judge's decision, the Board specifically found that the fined individual was not a supervisor within the definition of section 2(11), implying that had the member been designated a supervisor the Board, in light of its Toledo Blade reasoning, might have had to find a violation of section 8(b)(1)(B). In Carpenters Dist. Council (Miner-Dederick Constr. Corp.), 195 N.L.R.B. No. 28, 79 L.R.R. M. 1274 (1972) , the administrative law judge found the supervisor's "authority ... was hardly 'substantial' . . . so he was hardly a natural choice to handle grievances." Id., 79 L.R.R.M. at 1276. However, the administrative law judge, uncertain of the meaning of the Board's decision in Cork Insulating Co., supra, noted that his reliance upon the supervisor's limited authority may have been misplaced: "The Board may be of the view that if a man is a supervisor within the meaning of section 2(11), he ipso facto has 'substantial authority." ' Id., L.J. 424, 434 (1971) . 2257, 2261 (1972) . See also concurring and. dissenting opinion of Judge Wright. Id. at -n.6, 81 L.R.R.M. at 2272 n.6. this, the supervisors' contract violation was sufficiently similar to grievance adjustment to warrant 8(b)(1)(B) protection. Even if, however, the supervisors had in fact interpreted the contracts to permit their actions, contract interpretation, although perhaps a necessary component of grievance adjustment, is not synonymous with it.5° These initial discipline cases must, therefore, be taken as departures from prior 8 (b)(1)(B) decisions.
The requirement that discipline proscribed under 8(b)(l)(B) be connected with bargaining or contract interpretation was abandoned in Meat Cutters Local 81. 51 A chain of grocery stores had altered its meat procurement policy and directed supervisors to procure preprocessed meat, thus reducing the amount of work available for union members employed in the store. A supervisor who belonged to Local 81 of the Meat Cutters Union was fined and expelled for implementing the employer's order in contravention of a union policy requiring that grinding and slicing processes be performed in the store. Even though the NLRB's General Counsel did not argue that the supervisor had been disciplined for performing collective bargaining activities or adjusting grievances, 52 the Board held that section 8(b)(1)(B) had been violated since the supervisor had been disciplined for performing his duties as a management representative.rs Similarly, in Manhart-Alexander, Inc., 54 the Board found that a union had violated 8(b)(1)(B) by expelling a supervisor-member for crossing a picket line at the commencement of a strike to aid his employer in closing down the plant. 55 The Board's rationale in both cases was that the supervisors, while not performing collective bargaining or grievance adjustment functions, were disciplined for providing services expected of "management representatives." Board decisions involving discipline of supervisors for crossing picket lines to do work ordinarily performed by 50 rank and file employees 5 " represent an even greater expansion of 8(b)(1)(B). In these cases, the Board rested its conclusion on the ground that the supervisors could not be disciplined "for performing work which their [elmployer had directed them to perform." ' 7 The Board's analysis has received the approval of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which granted enforcement of the Board's order in IBEW v. NLRB. 58 In IBEW, the supervisor had been disciplined for performing struck work, for which, under AllisChalmei's, the union could fine employee-members. The court stated that the employer had a legitimate right "to call upon the undivided loyalty of its representatives" 59 to further its interests and that supervisory employees engaging in rank and file work during a strike "ate performing in a manner which could reasonably be expected from Such persons."t0
The Board's use of section 8(b)(1)(B) in supervisor-dlscipline cases presents problems of statutory interpretation. As noted above, the section was intended to serve a quite limited purpose. Congress desired to restritt union attempts to assert control over employers' selection of persons to represent him in dealings with the union. While the TaftHartley Act generally does not purport to affect the substance of collective bargaining agreements,6 1 it does regulate the parties' tactics, prohibiting those deemed sufficiently offensive to pose an unwarranted threat to labor peace, There is considerable justification for the Board's application of section 8(b)(1)(B) to cases in which unions have used their disciplinary power as a means of controlling supervisors to whom an employer had given some responsibility for bargaining or grievance adjustment. Such use of the disciplinary power can, at least arguably, impair labor peace to the same extent as attempts to control the identity of employer representatives. As the Board recognized in San Francisco-Oak- 
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land Mailers', both tactics can be seen as simply alternative means to the same end; both involve many of the same conflicting employer and union interests. 62 The Board's subsequent extension of 8(b)(1)(B), however, seems less justifiable. In cases in which unions had disciplined supervisors for actions unrelated to bargaining or grievance adjustment, and particularly in cases in which the supervisor had no bargaining or grievance adjustment responsibility whatever, application of 8(b)(1)(B) lacks support from either the text or the legislative history of the Act.
The unsuitability of section 8(b)(1)(B) to deal with the more general problem of union control over supervisors accounts for the Board's difficulty in articulating clear standards for its application. The use of the section to reach all union discipline of supervisors appears to be an attempt to give force to considerations that the Act implicitly recognizes, but for which it provides no specific enforcement mechanism. As the District of Columbia Circuit said in upholding a finding that discipline of a supervisor constituted a violation of 8(b)(1)(B): "[I]t is readily apparent, when all the relevant 1947 amendments to the Act are considered in concert, that Congress did not intend thereby to allow unions to subvert the 'undivided loyalty' it clearly believed such managerial personnel owed to their respective employers." ' 3 The court seems correct in asserting that the 1947 amendments, if not 8(b)(1)(B) specifically, provide a basis for proscribing discipline of supervisors even if they do not represent management for grievance or bargaining purposes. The discussions surrounding adoption of section 2(3), which eliminates supervisors from the category of protected employees, section 2(11), which separately defines supervisors, and section 14(a), which allows supervisors to be union members and provides that employers may not be forced to recognize supervisors as employees for collective bargaining, reflect concern over the relative extent of employer and union control of supervisors. These sections of the Act are the result of congressional balancing of the employer's interest in securing the loyalty of his supervisory officials, the interests of the supervisor in association vel non with a union, and the rank and file union's interests in obtaining supervisors' support.
As indicated above, 4 Congress's primary concern in the 1947 amendments was to enable management to carry out its wishes free of conflicting claims upon the loyalty of its chosen agents. At the same time, 
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The University of Chicago Law Review however, Congress wanted to safeguard supervisor and employee interests as well as to preserve long-established associations existing in some industries. 65 These conflicting concerns led to the adoption of a patchwork of legislative provisions. Management's freedom of action was compromised by provisions allowing continued supervisor-union relationships that could impose significant burdens on that freedom. The supervisor-discipline cases have involved the search for a resolution to this tension. The Act allows conflicts to exist between union and employer, but provide procedures into which disputes are channeled. Collective bargaining and the contractual, administrative, and judicial remedies for identifying and penalizing breach of collective bargaining contracts are the primary means that the labor laws prescribe for conflict resolution. Union discipline of supervisors interferes with this pattern in two ways. When a supervisor is disciplined for bargaining or adjusting grievances for the employer, the bargaining process is undermined by depriving the employer of effective representation. In such cases section 8(b)(1)(B) is violated. When a supervisor is disciplined for other actions taken in the course of his employment, the bargaining process is circumvented. This second type of interference with orderly collective bargaining should not be considered prohibited by 8(b)(1)(B). It is not a bargaining tactic, but rather a device, outside the bargaining process, for attaining union objectives. As such it should be held subject to the strictures of section 8(b)(5). 66 This section, unlike 8(b)(1)(B), was designed broadly to prevent unjustified circumvention of the bargaining process. Both employers and unions are required by the Act to engage in good faith bargaining concerning wages and other conditions of employment-employers under 8(a)(5) 6 7 and unions under 8(b)(3). An employer cannot refuse to bargain about such subjects with any majority union representing the affected employees. 6 8 And some employer actions, such as subcontracting for a substantial proportion of work normally performed by company employees, effect so great a change in employer-employee 65 Prior to the passage of the Taft-Hartley amendments in 1947, foremen generally maintained membership in employee unions and were included in contracts covering rank and file employees in a number of industries, including printing and building trades and metal trades insofar as they operated on a craft basis. With regard to teamsters and longshoremen, the practices varied. U.S. Dep [40:185
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relationship that the employer must bargain with the union before taking them. 69 At the same time, unions cannot require the employer to bargain about subjects not related to wages and other conditions of employment; 7 0 if they attempt to do so, their action is outside the scope of activity protected by the Act. 71 In addition, unions cannot, during the contract's term, demand that employers agree to changes in items covered by a valid collective bargaining agreement. 72 Like massive subcontracting, union discipline of supervisors for performing work as directed by management or exercising discretion delegated by management is an attempt to restructure the relationship between the employer and employees 3 It allows the union to exercise essential control over the operations of the business. 4 To the extent that the Board's 8(b)(1)(B) decisions indicate that the union's power to discipline supervisors is not a mandatory subject of bargaining because unrelated to wages and conditions of employment, unions may not bargain to impasse in order to obtain it. If such union disciplinary power is a mandatory subject of bargaining-if it relates to wages and conditions of employment-then the union may not exercise it unless the employer, in a collective bargaining agreement, has clearly assented or the union has bargained to impasse. In the absence of the employer's assent or, at least, impasse, the union's discipline of supervisors subverts the bargaining process in violation of 8(b)(3): it is an attempt by the union to avoid whatever grievance adjustment and arbitration mechanisms its contract with the employer may contain 74 Unions normally exercise their influence on the direction of the employer's operation through the contract. Union actions designed to procure the employer's agreement to a change in working conditions are viewed only as presenting a demand to the employer; they do not consitute a violation of 8(b)(3). Ben Cutler v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1968) (union amended bylaws during contract negotiations to specify higher wage scale and to establish new welfare fund). Union attempts unilaterally to change the employment relationship do, however, violate 8(b)(3). For example, a union's unilateral imposition of production quotas, enforceable by fines, constitutes a refusal to bargain in violation of 8(b)(3). Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. NLRB, 352 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1965) . See also C. MoRsIS, supra note 12, at 326-27.
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The University of Chicago Law Review and to restrain the employer's action on valid subjects of bargaining without any attempt to bargain. By using section 8(b)(3) to deal with supervisory discipline outside the scope of section 8(b)(1)(B), the Board could openly balance the asserted interests and determine whether the union's action in a given case is justified in light of possible harm either to orderly bargaining or to the substance of the bargain, including agreed enforcement mechanisms.
III. PARTICIPATION BY SUPERVISORS IN UNION AFFAIRS
The limitations that the Board has imposed on unions' power to discipline supervisors create tensions with Board decisions concerning the permissible extent of supervisors' participation in union affairs. Section 14(a) of the Act, which allows supervisors to be union members, 7 5 contains no guidelines for determining the meaning of the term "membership." Most questions of supervisors' participation in employee unions have been raised in proceedings under section 8(a)(2),76 proscribing employer interference with or domination of a union, and section 8(a)(l),77 prohibiting employer interference with employees' exercise of their section 778 organizational and bargaining rights.
In Nassau & Suffolk Contractors' Association, 70 the Board ruled that no supervisor-member can serve on the union's negotiation committee and that the employer's acquiescence in such participation constitutes interference with the administration of the union, in violation of section 8(a)(2). The Board concluded that the loyalty of supervisors to management inevitably prevents them from being the union's most effective negotiators. 80 Although the Board excluded both high-and low-level supervisors from contract negotiations, 8 ' it allowed low-level supervisors to engage actively in internal union affairs absent proof of [40:185
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employer encouragement, authorization, or ratification. 8 2 Low-level supervisors have, according to the Board, a right to a "voice and a vote in the administration of the affairs of the union."s 3 The Nassau doctrine has allowed low-level supervisors to attend union meetings, 8 4 hold union office, 8 5 and engage in other forms of union activity" whenever the rank and file union represents them in collective bargaining. Moreover, the Board has permitted the participation of low-level supervisor-members even though they are not included in the same bargaining unit with rank and file employees. 8 7 The Board has rejected the contention that its Nassau holding is precluded by the Landrum-Griffin Act's 8 8 guarantee of "equal rights and privileges within such organization" to all union members. 8 9 Instead, the Board has construed that guarantee to apply only to rank
